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THE AMERICAN TRADITION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND*

TRADITION is a peculiarly happy theme for us to consider at this
gathering to open a new house of learning in the law. Our theme
is not retrospection alone. We, who have received our tradition from
those who went before, hold it a little while, and in our turn pass it to
our waiting successors. We most fittingly seize this moment from all the
busyness of life to look backward, to remind ourselves what we have,
and, looking forward, to see in the mists of times still to come what we
can expect for our children's children. And surely our constitutional
system itself is a great theme in this contemplation of our past, and in
this forecast of our future.
This house we have come to dedicate is strongly built. For its steel and
its masonry surely a half-century would be a short life. We wish that it
may stand as long as some of the venerable university halls in Europe.
But we need foresee no such centuries-long span of existence to realize
that this hall will see, on the calendar, numerals which would seem to us
strangely great. In those future years this house will see alterations of
many other things, things which we have come to accept as necessary
because to us they have been familiar. Young men who next year begin
the study of law in this building will return, notable alumni in their
early and vigorous sixties, to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of their
graduation and the centennial of the school's establishment. That will
be in June, 2005. To those returning sons, the years since they left
Fordham will seem as brief as, next June, the years that have passed
will seem for the class that entered in 1905. Today, in this place, the
past is all recent and the future is only tomorrow.
At such a moment we can appropriately appraise the constitutional
tradition under which we live, under which our laws and our institutions
have developed. We can most properly ask ourselves what were essentials in the constitutionalism of John Marshall, as he began his Chief
Justiceship in 1801; ask how these principles fared during the century
ending in 1901; ask how they have fared in the next sixty years only now
completed. Looking backward, we may see a past course which announces our course still to come. The direction of our movement may
predict our constitutionalism as it will be when this school shall have
completed its first century.
The essentials of the Founding Fathers' idea of a free and viable gov* Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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ernment cannot be discerned simply by making a topical analysis of the
Constitution of 1789 and of its first ten amendments. The constitutional
document is intended to provide solutions for specific problems, solutions
sought under great principles; but it is not a statement of those principles themselves. Our constitutionalism is far older than that writing.
The word "constitution" can be used to describe not only a document,
but rather a body of traditional doctrine. Taken in the English usage,
and in the usage of our colonial forefathers, it appropriately means the
theory of our polity, the group of concepts making up our philosophy of
government. In that sense our Constitution is far older than the American experience of our people. We may well, on this day of good omen,
remind ourselves of those concepts, those curiously self-contradictory
aspirations, those checks and balances, rightly so called in a sense far
more profound than they are taken in our habitual usage.
First among them, I suggest, is a deep, insistent belief, clung to
through all doubts, through all dismay at indications of human frailty
and selfishness and political unwisdom-belief in the right of our people
to seek for their own political and economic salvation, to contend for it
in competitive persuasion, and ultimately to determine it for themselves.
This is a doctrine founded on an optimistic trust in mankind, on a faith
in man's essential goodness and in his evolving wisdom. Though we
might, we do not choose to state this doctrine as the constitutional privilege of our people to blunder, to be selfish, to go to perdition in their own
way. In our theory we are still the children of our country's happy
youth: let us only be free from all tyrants, we still tell ourselves, let us
only have full liberty to seek our own salvation; then we shall certainly
find it in all its inevitable goodness. We sometimes remind ourselves, for
the sake of the rhetoric, that this freedom involves possible choice of evil
ways; but this possibility we state only to dismiss such a choice as completely incredible. If free, we shall surely be good, and wise, and happy.
I remind you a little sourly that today in much of the world this is by no
means taken as an obvious truism, an accepted canon of political theory.
Our whole concept of the predestined benign result of the first amendment, of free competition of ideas, of dissent and persuasion, argument
and partisan pressure, is by no means everywhere taken as datum. But
among us the happy ending is still an article of faith. We stoutly and
persistently assert that where truth and falsehood grapple, contending
for majority assent in free and open encounter, truth will not be put to
the worse, and free men will freely choose the right. This doctrine underlies our explicit guarantees of free expression and free political participation; but the doctrine itself is far wider than any of its phenomena.
In our constitutional antithesis of beliefs we counter this doctrine
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with another commitment, equally deep-a belief in rightness which is
independent of majority will. Majorities, we profoundly know, can be
wrong. We continually seek for institutions to find rightness. We work
and rework forms of words to guide us in this search, trying one formula
after another, as successive phrases one by one prove to be only repetitiously synonymous. Coke's 1610 "common right and reason" in
Bonham's Case;' Marshall's "nature of society and of government" in
Fletcher v. Peck2 two hundred years later; Van Devanter's "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice" in his 1926 Hebert' opinion; Cardozo's
1937 "concept of ordered liberty" in Palko's case; Frankfurter's "canons of decency and fairness" in his 1947 Adamsona opinion; none of
these formulations quite satisfies. Still under each lies a faith much older
than the oldest of them, a conviction that even if we cannot state the
difference in a discriminating test phrase, wrong differs from right; and
we know that our governors and our lawmakers, being fallible men, can
do wrong even when they speak with the voice of the multitude.
In the written Constitution we find this aspiration latent in the clauses

requiring government to act only with "due process." Today, conjecture
as to what the eighteenth century draftsmen of the fifth amendment intended by those words has little importance. What the congressional
committeemen may have meant by them in 1866 when they formulated
the fourteenth amendment is an obscure mystery. Yet some idea of es-

sential rightness we have found we must have in our Constitution; the
due process clauses have absorbed the idea.

A third constitutional belief is the equality of man-a difficult doctrine, which Jefferson stated as self-evident in the Declaration of Independence, but which eleven years later the draftsmen of the Constitution
not only omitted, but countered by express provision recognizing human
slavery.6 Even today, though slavery has been gone nearly a century, we
do not mean just what we say in the equal protection clause.7 Government necessarily must treat some persons differently from others--children differently from adults in those matters where tender years call for
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Dr. Bonham's Case, S Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610).
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) S7, 135 (1810).
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Adamson v. California, 332 US. 46, 67 (1947) (concurring opinion).

6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 provides: "Representatives and direct taxes zhall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their re-psctive numbers, which -hall
be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including thoas bound to
service for a term of years, and ... three fifths of all other persons." U.S. Const. arL Ii,
§ 2 also provides for the reacquiring of fugitive slaves.

7. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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difference; women differently from men where appropriate; in public education, the intellectually alert differently from the slow; in the administration of justice, the prospective incorrigible differently from the prospectively regenerated criminal. One perceives our doctrine to be that all
men are created equal as to those matters in which government justly
should treat men alike; and so at length we come to see that this doctrine,
like that of due process, turns on the elusive formulation of that which is
just. We have committed ourselves, and rightly, to complete equality
between men in respect to their different races and religions. But, so
familiar that we scarcely perceive it, we hold with near unanimity to governmental protection of economic inequality. In 1791 we grouped property with liberty and life when we listed those things especially protected
by the fifth amendment; we restated this conviction in 1868 when we
adopted the fourteenth. To equality, as to liberty, we aspire as an ideal;
but in the meaning, the effectuation, the distribution of that ideal we
have found a multitude of differences.
A fourth constitutional postulate is that government must be fragmented lest any part of it be too strong, lest any group of political rulers
too completely control the citizen and his nonpolitical associations, his
Church, his labor union, his family, his school, his university. Inherent
in the calculated diffusion of power in our constitutional arrangements,
in our federal structure, in the ninth and the tenth amendments, in the
separation of governmental powers, is a conviction of the value of
privateness, of the worth of the nongovernmental, of the richness of
individualism. Here is another great antithesis of constitutional theory,
so widely accepted that it is often unperceived. It generally goes unstated, for in a majoritarian polity the doctrine of cherished individualism, of protected privateness, of defended nongovernment, is the
counterbalance for egalitarianism. Our diffusion of power, the better to
secure liberty, postulates the right to excel, if excelling results from
natural ability; it assumes as datum competition with others in a contest
for private achievement; it accepts, as desirable, inequality derived from
unequal talents. Men comfortingly hide from themselves this antithesis,
by praising "equality of opportunity"-meaning that institutions of government should ideally be so arranged that the naturally talented, the
men of native endowments, be not by political means inhibited from excelling the less gifted. Here again is the optimism of the enlightenment.
Here is our commitment to equal educational access that it may foster
native superiority of gifts. A half-century ago I became a devoted reader
of the books of Horatio Alger, Jr., now little sought, read only occasionally by literary antiquarians who are apt to speak with a bit of
superciliousness of the author's repeated theme, a poor but able boy's
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success. Rightly considered, this once-celebrated teller of tales stated,
again and again, a fundamental aspiration of our constitutional theory.
The gifted individual, so we have thought, best uses his talent when governmental power is segmented, when he is not constrained to mediocrity
by the too-concentrated political force of a less able, envious majority.
Precisely because such underlying theses of our constitutional system
are not expressly so written in the charter, analysis of our theory is difficult; different men will evaluate our aspirations differently at any one
time; the same man's views will change with years and circumstances.
But for the moment, unsure of my completeness, I think that most
of us hold at least these four doctrines, and hold them at the same
time despite their contradictions. Surely these four are a great part of
the constitutional tradition we have received. Surely we do well, this
afternoon, to ask ourselves how they will fare during the next four decades, what men will think of them when the sons of this school gather
to celebrate its centennial year, and what part the wisdom and learning
encouraged by our schools of law will play during those years to come
in guarding those ideas, in developing and applying them, and perhaps in
changing them to fit changed conditions of life.
The theory and the law of our constitutional system, like all legal
theory, grows out of the experiences, the beliefs, and wants, and the
fears of our people. So to foresee our constitutional course, one should
seek to foresee what will happen to us economically, socially, politically,
in the years between 1961 and 2005. Foremost, it seems to me, among
the governmental facts that will face us, is the continuing prospect of
war. For much of our national history we have been able to enjoy the
comforting self-assurance that all things having to do with warfare were
atypical, occasional, brief interruptions of our normal functions of subduing a rich and abundant continent, and turning its good things to our
use. A man who entered on the study of law in the early twenties of
this century will remember the relief with which the country greeted
Warren Gamaliel Harding's campaign slogan, "Back to Normalcy," as
a contrast to a year and seven months of the war just then ended. The
lawbooks of the time gave little attention to warfare as a constitutional
factor. We then read and received with comfort the words of Mr. justice
Davis in his Milligan opinion, handed down when Appomattox was fresh
history:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men,
at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
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can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine
leads directly to anarchy or despotism .... 8
Our very phrase, "a state of war," carries forward this idea of intermittence, of definite separation from the norm of peace. But popular
usage of words can sometimes reveal a widespread sensed wisdom, and
today's phrase "cold war" indicates the impossibility of survival of
Milligan in its literalness. Indeed the generous theory of Milligan's case
was probably an overstatement even in its own day. It becomes the more
unreal in a time when our daily tabletalk concerns the most effective
design of entrenchments to protect our families against sudden attack
delivered at home. Hamilton in 1787, arguing in the Twenty-fifth Federalist for federal power to maintain a standing army, wrote in irony of
our impossible situation if that power should be denied:
the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the
world has yet seen,--that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare
for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation
of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories
must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies....
We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind
of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering storm,
must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free government.
We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and
invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we
are afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger
that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservationY
No real prospect of change toward international trustfulness seems
apparent in the prospect of the next half-century. One hears and reads
of the "garrison state" as an ill-defined horror, inevitable if we assume
a position in readiness, whose very name demonstrates that it is intolerable for our people. But surely the constitutional problems of the next
few generations will not be solved by epithets. Man's most appalling
problems are ghastly in their simplicity; only the solutions are complex
and obscure. The most profound influence on the constitutional system
of the United States during the lives of our children and our grandchildren will be our national necessity either to trust in those nations we
dare not trust, or to organize our wills, our lives and our resources with
wisdom, steadfastness and good heart, to sustain the perilous existence
which man, like other living creatures, has found to be his lot through
uncounted past generations. We shall not escape the necessity of choice
by any rhetorical exorcism; not by repeating to one another:
8.
9.

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866).
The Federalist No. 25, at 167 (Bourne ed. 1937) (Hamilton).
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For God's sake, let us sit upon the ground
And tell sad stories ....10

Rather, during the years ahead, will it be the high duty of the men of
this and like centers of thought and learning so to fashion and guide
our polity that we shall keep what is essential and generous in our constitutionalism, and still stand to arms with those neighbor-nations who
will stand with us.
Another change in our state, already upon us but only coming to be
recognized, is our turning to life in crowds. Our grandchildren must
cope with this fact; we have not quite yet brought ourselves to do so.
We are suddenly discovering, to our somewhat naive surprise, that most
of us are living in fantastically large cities, whose inhabitants pay little
attention to the boundaries of what we still like to call sovereign
states. By infinitely complex organizations of men and machines we
supply ourselves in these immense aggregates of people, with the necessities and luxuries of existence. As our megalopolitan cities grow larger
and larger, they compound as they grow, both in their mechanical and
their animate complexity. This swiftly increasing corporate interdependence of man is a social and political fact which, equally with wars and
rumors of wars will govern the constitutionalism of the generations
ahead. More than a quarter of a century ago a President of the United
States, in a moment of frustration at a decision of the Supreme Court,
reminded a press conference that the economic arrangements prescribed
in our Constitution had been written in a time when communities were
largely self-supporting, in the eighteenth century, in the '%orse and
buggy days." He posed as the choice then before the country-only a
rhetorical choice, surely-a return to a government of discrete, horse
and buggy ineffectiveness, or an advance to a government whose central
national power would control its complex economy.11
The choice of central controls, then made by a country with a population of one hundred thirty million, has become more obviously inevitable as our people have since added fifty million to their numbers. The
necessities of centralized economic organization will increase as the
nation grows ever more crowded, more urban, as its various regions grow
to be more and more interdependent while the next generations follow
in trace. Our once comfortable confidence that there will always be more
land, more metals, more fuel, more food, will be troubled by increasing
i0. Shakespeare, King Richard II, act M, sc. 2, 1. 151-52.
11. Press Conference by Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 31, 1935, in 4 The Public Paplrs
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 200-21 (1933). The subject of the conference
was the Supreme Court's decision in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.s. 495 (1935).
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doubt, by consciousness that we must ration ourselves. And the pressures
that have pushed our cities outward and outward, ignoring state boundaries, surely will, to an extent now barely perceivable, cause the
economic organization of mankind to transcend the boundaries between
nations. As I write these pages, the newspapers tell of one of our aircraft flown at a speed of more than four thousand miles to the hour, and
tell of the President of the United States suggesting new modes of extensive economic cooperation between our nation and our friends abroad.
These two facts are not disconnected. No one who scans our constitutional history can escape the conclusion that interdependence of nations
and swift communication between them deeply affect our internal law.
A treaty with Switzerland changes inheritances in Virginia; 12 a treaty
with Canada restricts wild fowl shooting in Missouri; 13 an executive
agreement has a bearing on an asserted governmental taking of property
in New York. 4 But I leave to wiser men the future trajectory of international constitutionalism. There is enough for me to cultivate in our
own garden.
The new school in which we meet today will thus, we are certain, see
swift changes in the life of our people. What effect will these changes
have on the four fundamentals of our constitutional tradition which I
earlier discussed? On the majoritarian control of our government? On
our higher law tradition? On our aspiration to the equality of man? On
our calculated weakening, by division, of political government in order
that we may more freely go our own way one by one, or in private
groups?
In this last I foresee the greatest changes. The exigencies of life under
arms will not permit, to the extent we have thought appropriate in past
years, either the division of powers between nation and state, or the
separation of central powers between the Congress and the President.
This movement away from fragmentation of government is not unprecedented among us. In Madison's Presidency we discovered that warfare
was a matter for central control, inconsistent with option in some of
the states to choose little participation in the campaigns and that
participation lukewarm. And during a much later war, fought in a far
Asian peninsula, under circumstances which the constitution makers of
the 1780's could scarcely have predicted, we found that constitutional
12. Treaty with the Swiss Confederation on Commerce, Friendship, Establishments, and
Surrender of Criminals, Nov. 25, 1850, 11 Stat. 587, T.S. No. 353; see Hauensteln v.
Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
13. Treaty with Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916,
39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628; see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
14. See Russia v. National City Bank, 69 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1934).
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limitations on the President's powers as compared to those of the Congress and unrestricted private power of decision by organized labor to
work or to concertedly refuse to work, could produce grave difficulties
in the economic mobilization that is essential to support modern war,
and to support preparation for possible war.
I remember President Lincoln's "grave question whether any government, not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough
to maintain its existence in great emergencies,"'G but I do not expect to
see it answered by an overruling of the Stecl Seizure'0 case. I do not
expect a judicial repudiation of Justice Jackson's trenchant remark,
"that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in
Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants." 7 Rather if
similar but even graver crises arise in the future, I expect to see followed other courses that were suggested in the same opinion of that
wise one-time Attorney General. He there wrote:
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a vorkmble government.
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.10

As crisis succeeds ensuing crisis, I expect to see the Congress recognize that emergency has ceased to be occasional and has become a continuing condition of our national life. We shall, I think, see reference to
Chief Justice White's comforting statement in Wilson v. Alcw,19 written
on the eve of the first World War, made as he brushed aside an argu0
ment from Ex parte Milligan:2
[A]Ithough an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived,
nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living por;er
already enjoyed. 2'

We shall see much ready congressional delegation of broad discretionary
power to the President, and for this we shall have ample precedent in
congressional practice, and in such statements as that of Mr. Justice
15.
16.
17.
18.

Lincoln, Response to a Serenade, Nov. 10, 164.
Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 643-44 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 635.
19. 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
20. 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 2 (1866).
21. 243 U.S. at 343.
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Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright2 2 stressing the President's access to confidential information affecting our relation with foreign nations, which
discloses the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to

lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed,2

These prophecies have been stated in a context of military vigilance;
but whether the impulse to change be possible war or the difficult
organization of life in peace, the same tendency to less diffusion of
powers among the states, and concentration of national powers in the
Presidency, will, I think, be progressively more evident in the whole
governmental process which controls the economy. Our swift increase
in numbers, our increasing crowds in great interstate cities, makes our
whole maintenance of existence more vulnerable because more dependent
on the continued efficient functioning of our human organizations and
on their technological devices, which though more and more activated,
controlled, directed, and stopped by only a few experts, are essential
to feed, transport, and serve vast multitudes. Here, too, stoppage by any
group becomes the occasion of public crisis. That which was tolerable
and of merely private concern among the simple plural human organizations of our early days, becomes unbearable, a matter of necessary
governmental concern, as we grow more vulnerable. And here, as in
military measures, a habit of statutory delegation of wider and wider
powers to the executive becomes probable.
To state this group of consequences is not to rejoice in them. Recognition of the inevitable is not the same as satisfaction. We, who can still
remember a little of the quiet life before 1914, will probably wish it
back again, as time erases recollection of its occasional parochialisms
and its unconsciousness of wrongs we now recognize. We are apt to
remember only its freedom from the greater troubles we now face, and
which our children's children will have to face hereafter.
And in all this, what of our other great commitments? What of our
hard-won right to govern ourselves by our own choices; of our aspiration
to govern justly; of our urge to equality in race and faith and in political
participation? Are these to be diminished by the concentration of power
inevitable in our generations of continuing crisis? I hope not; and indeed
the future may see these good aspirations increasingly fulfilled. Shared
peril breaks down the barriers between man and man, as many of us
have learned in active warfare. And I see no prospect of backward steps
on the road toward equal opportunity, based on individual merit, for all
our people, though I see probable changes in our estimate of the in22.
23.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Id. at 321-22.
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dividual prizes for which opportunity opens. I see increasing limitation,
widely applied by the taxing process, on the earnings and accumulations
of everyone, a process already well under way. More and more costly
machines of war which we must have if we are not to stand defenseless; elaborate transportation devices which keep our spreading cities
alive, and which can only be built and maintained at public cost; the
massive dwellings of megalopolis, which in one form or another are
more and more dependent on governmental subsidy; the services of
education, health, cultivation, and amusement which our people more
and more demand from political rather than private sources; the increasingly complex and costly machinery of government requisite to
keep this multiple activity ordered; all these will absorb a larger and
larger share of our aggregate effort. And this will measure itself in
taxes, inevitably heaviest on the most successfully acquisitive. Thus
we shall, I foresee, continue our present movement toward economic
egalitarianism. In the year 2005 success will be measured more by control
of power than by magnitude of possessions; we shall remember the words
of Mr. Justice Holmes that "the prize of the general is not a bigger tent,
but command.112 4 If this change turns more and more of our ablest people
to the devoted service of government, we may come to welcome it.
I expect no restriction of our popular access to political power. The
greater the role of government, the greater our change to political
means to do those things which our fathers felt suitable only for private
endeavor, the more conscious our people will be that whatever governmental mechanisms they choose for these functions must be within their
ultimate over-all control. There are signs, as this is written, that the
Supreme Court may reexamine the constitutional questions presented
by statutory inequality of political access even when unrelated to race; 2 3
signs that possibly the Court may abandon the theory that this opportunity of participation in government presents a "political question," beyond proper judicial scrutiny. And concentration of central authority
over national matters will probably not take from the citizens' hands
those questions of government primarily of local concern even where
this would be constitutionally possible. I do not expect to see us give
up government either for the people, or by the people.
And assuredly no change in our circumstances will end our commit24. Address by Justice Holmes, Harvard Law School Association of ew,Yorl, Feb.
15, 1913, in Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 293 (1920).
25. In Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. S24 (DD. Tenn. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 364
U.S. S9S (1961), the court held that it had no right under the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to grant a citizen voter's petition to declare
unconstitutional a 1901 reapportionment act.
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ment to justice and right in government, no matter what the mechanism
by which we choose to govern ourselves. On this hangs all our law. This,
before and after all, is an unchangeable article of our constitutional
faith.
More than three centuries ago in Massachusetts, a short distance from
where these words have been written, some pioneers, beset with hardship and peril, found it essential to build a log palisade around their little
settlement on the Charles River, to protect their lives, their families,
and their few possessions. Among them every man had to be a soldier
on call; every woman had to nerve herself to sustain danger and the
prospect of death. And yet there they founded a college which grew and
developed into a great university. Here at Fordham we have come together, in another time of anxiety and peril, to signalize the dedication
of a new house for legal scholarship in another great university. The
building of this house, in this time, is an act of faith in the system of our
fundamental law. The faith is well founded.

